Web proxy bypass technique exploiting Google Translate web rendering engine to access restricted intranets
Google Translate

Google Translate

the translated website pops out of Google Translate's iframe and redirects the user to a website or content of their choosing

Key takeaways
  • Web translation proxies can inadvertently act as unrestricted open forward proxies into internal networks.
  • Perimeter boundary filtering fails when trusted external services fetch arbitrary internal URLs.
  • SSRF risks live inside any feature that accepts user-supplied URLs for server-side processing.

http://www.google.co.uk/translate?hl=en&u=+++mn6i0.tk+%0A%0A++

Background:

“…Google Translate is a free statistical multilingual machine- translation service provided by Google Inc. to translate written text from one language into another. ..” - Wikipedia .

Think of Translate like Douglas Adam’s babelfish, but in an online, text form.

Vulnerability:

The former vulnerability is rather simple. After a few redirects to fool anti-fraud mechanisms, the translated website pops out of Translate’s iframe and redirects the user to a website or content of their choosing.

Solution:

One may use HTML5-sandbox iframes to prevent the top level hijacking. Google engineers implemented HTML5 to mitigate the vulnerability. But in the interests of those web developers who utilize Flash, Silverlight and other interesting development tools, Translate enables translators to disable “Translated in Safe Mode.” This results in allowing the translator to slit their throat. To each their own.